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1Abstract
The cyclicality and volatility of property prices have been extensively documented.
Many explanations have been proposed. This paper builds a simple dynamic general
equilibrium model in which these often cited channels are assumed away. Instead, the
role of intertemporal elasticity of substitution is highlighted. In this model, the land
price can exhibit price cycles. Moreover, the land price always ﬂuctuates more than
the aggregate output. The welfare of diﬀerent cohorts depends crucially on the land
price at the period they were born. The implications of these results are discussed.
Key words: land price cycle, oscillatory convergence, intertemporal substitution
JEL classiﬁcation: E30, G12, R20
21 Introduction
Cyclicality and volatility of property and land prices have been extensively documented. For
instance, Borio et al. (1994) and Renaud (1997) shows that there was a global real estate
cycle among the OECD countries in between 1985 to 1994. Employing the Kalman Filter
and data of more than a century, Ball et al. (1996) ﬁnd very signiﬁcant and long period
cycles in non-residential property market, and Ball and Wood (1999) ﬁnd similar results for
the residential property market. Ortalo-Magne and Rady (1998) show that the real housing
prices in the US and UK ﬂuctuate more than the real GDP.1
Attempts have been made to explain the boom-bust cycles of property and land prices.
There is a large literature on speculation and bubbles in the housing market as well as
other asset prices such as stock prices (see for example, Case and Shiller (1989), Abraham
and Hendershott (1995), Sato (1995), Ito and Iwaisako (1996), Levin and Wright (1997),
and Muellbauer and Murphy (1997)). Many of these studies found evidence of speculative
behavior to be a signiﬁcant factor causing wide swings in property or land prices.
On the other hand, much research has focused on how house prices relate to market fun-
damentals. Stein (1995) rationalizes the appear-to-be excess house price volatility by changes
in fundamentals. Given a down payment requirement and the initial distribution of house-
hold debt levels, the model demonstrates that there is a potential for multiple equilibria,
and that a small change in fundamentals can generate within-equilibrium multiplier eﬀects,
leading to large, discontinuous jumps in prices. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Ortalo-Magne
and Rady (1998), Chen (2001), among others, also generate the cyclical behavior of asset
(land) prices. The crucial element of their results is that the interactions of credit constraint
and collateral value (land/housing prices) generate large and persistent ﬂuctuations in ag-
gregate variables.2 For empirical evidence, Chinloy (1996) ﬁnds that the real estate cycles
1See Leung (2004) for a review of the literature.
2Alternatively, property price ﬂuctuations can also be generated by a search theoretic model, as demon-
strated by Wheaton (1990).
3depend on the lag in construction, planning, and entitlement, and also the lumpy cost of
vacancy and releasing. Leung et al. (2002), Leung and Feng (2004) ﬁnd that the short-term
ﬂuctuations of housing prices tend to be induced by the “down payment eﬀect.” Based on
survey data and oﬃcial data, Dokko et al. (1999), Edelstein and Paul (2000), Edelstein et
al. (2001) ﬁnd that the ﬂuctuations of land price can be largely explained by the change in
expectations (survey data) and changes of income generated by the corresponding land.
In this paper we study the dynamics of “land” prices and its welfare implications in an
overlapping generations model.3 It is well known that the land price ﬂuctuations can have
important implications on the well-being of the economic agents. Historical research such as
King (1973), Macfarlane (1978) ﬁnd that the land market has been developed and operated
for many centuries and that the distribution of the land endowment (or inheritance) can
have signiﬁcant implications on the intra-generational inequality as well as inter-generational
mobility. Recent studies on developing country generate similar results. For instance, Singh
(1982) ﬁnds that land sale in India has important implications to both intra- and inter-
generational distribution of income and welfare. This paper takes a preliminary step on
this direction and focuses on the inter-generational dynamics. There are several reasons to
employ an overlapping generations model. When the model is interpreted literally, it helps
to explain the “long cycles” identiﬁed by the empirical literature.4 Alternatively, it can be
interpreted as “waves of myopic investors”.5 Moreover, overlapping gen e r a t i o n sm o d e l sa l s o
generate transactions of land and real estate across cohorts naturally, which will prove to be
an important mechanism of our results here.
Applying an overlapping generations model to the study of the land (real estate) mar-
ket is not new,6 however, this paper diﬀers from the previous literature in the following
3There is a related literature on the relationship between housing and economic growth, such as Brito and
Pereira (2002). Here the focus is very diﬀerent. We study the relationship between housing price ﬂuctuation
and the aggregate economy (which is “constant” in the baseline model).
4For instance, see Ball et al. (1996), Ball and Wood (1999).
5Among others, see Bernanke and Gertler (1989) for more discussion on this interpretation.
6For instance, see Brueckner and Pereira (1997) and the reference therein.
4aspects. First, land serves as an input for production (from the aggregate perspective) and
also an investment vehicle (from an individual perspective). Second, the model is inten-
tionally abstracted from many features which are considered in the previous studies that
have been proposed to explain the cyclicality of land prices. They include the market fric-
tions (informational asymmetry, collateral constraints, adjustment costs, and construction
lag), uncertainty (persistent stochastic shocks), government intervention (taxation and pol-
icy changes), and bubbles. This paper complements the literature by showing that while
these features are important, the equilibrium land price could still display “cycles” even
without these features. It means that the land price oscillates above and below the steady
state value, and even may not restore to the steady state values in some special cases. In
particular, land prices exhibit cycles even when the aggregate output, wage and rental are
constant over time. That says, the land price in this model ﬂuctuates more than the aggre-
gate output, as found in Ortalo-Magne and Rady (1998). Speciﬁcally, the equilibrium land
price is either constant over time, or it exhibits oscillatory dynamics. In fact, the path of
transitional dynamics can be indeterminate, even when the steady state is unique. The land
price cycles are, in a sense, intrinsic.7
Moreover, we ﬁnd that the nature of the dynamics of land prices depend crucially on
certain combinations of preference parameters, such as the rate of time preference and the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. In addition, the model is constructed in a manner
that, even when the aggregate output in the model is unaﬀected by the ﬂuctuations of the
land price, the welfare of diﬀerent cohorts may vary and depend on the price of the land at
the period they were born.8 As an application, we also extend the analysis to a situation
7See Baumol and Benhabib (1989) for an exposition of diﬀerent types of dynamics. See also Mount-
ford (2002) where multiple steady states are possible without any cyclical dynamics, which seems to be
complementary to our work.
Notice that we abstract from the fact that in practice, land lots are "discrete" and subject to the govern-
ment regulations. We attempt to focus on the "intrinsic nature" of land price which does not depend on the
particular details of the government regulations, which vary across countries and time periods.
8Empirically, the ﬂuctuation of land price could aﬀect the aggregate output, and that would strengthen
the results here.
5when the probability of second period survival depends on the ﬁrst period consumption.9
This can be interpreted as the case of a developing country, or a developed economy in earlier
centuries, when land and labor are crucial factors of production.10 Under this scenario, the
movement of land price, which redistribute wealth across generations, will have an additional
impact to the economy. A high land price could lead to a lower level of consumption for
the young generation, which leads to a lower level of survival probability. It in turns aﬀect
the distribution of consumption in the following period. Under some parameter values, it
can be shown that this extension can lead to multiple steady states and very rich dynamics
in land price, as well as in population size. This may shed light on the widely documented
historical experience of certain economies, especially when land played a very important in
the aggregate production (Gottlieb (1976), Macfarlane (1979), and Sakolski (1932)).
It should be stressed that understanding the dynamics of land price can contribute to
our understanding on the aggregate economy, as land is an important input even for modern
economies. For instance, with time series data from 1961 to 1995, Kiyotaki and West (2004)
report that the elasticity of substitution between land and capital in the aggregate Japan
production function is close to unity. Borio et al. (1994), Kwon (1998), IMF (2000), and
Gerlach and Peng (2003), to name a few, examine the relationship between the role of real
estate prices behind the lending boom and bust during the late 1980s and 1990s, and ﬁnd
that bank lending is closely correlated with property prices in both developed and developing
economies. In particular, recent empirical works conﬁrm the prominent role of land serving
as collateral in mitigating credit constraint of ﬁrms. For example, Kiyotaki and West (1996)
and Ogawa and Kitasaka (1999) ﬁnd that land value signiﬁcantly aﬀects aggregate investment
of Japanese ﬁrms. Using ﬁrm-level data, Ogawa and Suzuki (1998, 2000), and Ogawa and
Kitasaka (1999) ﬁnd that the movement in land price signiﬁcantly aﬀects the investment
behavior of credit-constrained ﬁrms in Japan.
9Among others, see Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) for evidence.
10For instance, MacFarlane (1979) documents that property market is indeed very active in England since
1400.
6The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model
and illustrate the possibility of oscillatory dynamics with numerical examples. We also
investigate the welfare implications land price ﬂuctuations for diﬀerent cohorts. Section 3
extends the analysis to non-separable utility functions. Section 4 then extends our analysis
to endogenous survival probability. The last section concludes.
2 A Simple Dynamic Model
Consider an overlapping generations (OLG) model in which there is a ﬁxed quantity of
durable asset, which is referred to as land thereafter.11 The economy lasts forever but agents
only live for two periods.12 Each agent is endowed with one unit of labor when young, and
nothing when old. The young generation of period t supplies labor inelastically,13 receives
wage wt, consumes c1,t, and purchases land lt at unit price qt,w h i c hi st h e nr e n t e do u tt o
the ﬁrms to serve as a productive input, with a rate of return rt+1 at period t+1. The land
will also be resold at unit price qt+1.14 The old agent then consumes both the rental income
11OLG model has been widely used at least since the publication of Diamond (1965). For more discussions,
for instance, see Azariadis (1993).
12Here, we implicitly assume that the population is constant over time to simplify the explosition. It will
be relaxed in a later section.
13Empirically, the labor supply elasticity for men are small, and get even smaller as the lenght of period
extends. Among others, see the survey by Blundell, R., MaCurdy, T., (1999), Pencavel, J., (1986)
14Even though land is often considered to be indivisible, in the paper we take the extreme position to
assume that it is perfectly divisible. We defend our assumption as follows. In macroeconomic analysis, it
is well known that ﬁxed capital investment is lumpy, i.e., indivisible (for instance, see the survey paper by
Caballero (1999)). Despite the “indivisible nature” of the capital stock, it is accustomed to assume that
the capital stock to be “divisible”, so that the researchers can focus on other issues. In other words, the
“diﬀerentiability” can be interpreted as an approximation. It is true in other ﬁelds as well. For instance,
measured “ability” is “discrete,” but labor economist tend to model “ability” as a continuous variable in
order to focus on more important issues (for instance, see Becker (1993) for a review). In microeconomics
and general equilibrium theory, the total amount of consumer is also frequently modeled as a continuous
variable while in reality we only have a ﬁnite number of people (for instance, see Hildenbrand (1974)). By
the same token, for a country like U.S., which probably has millions of “lots” within the whole country, the
“discreteness of land lot” seems to be too burdensome to carry around and it seems reasonable to use the
diﬀerentiable assumption instead. In our view, the observed “indivisibility” of land is not intrinsic, but is
rather created by the government regulation and “lot division”. Our paper, as the title suggests, attempts
to focus on the intrinsic nature of the land itself and thus assumes away regulations that may vary across
7and resale value of land before exiting form the economy. Each generation maximizes the







s.t. c1,t + qtlt = wt, (1)
c2,t+1 =( qt+1 + rt+1)lt. (2)
where c1,t denotes the consumption of the young generation at period t, c2,t+1 denotes the
consumption of the old generation at period t +1 , qt is the price of land at period t,a n d
θ is the rate of time preference. The utility function u(.) is concave, u0(.) > 0, u00(.) < 0.
Notice that this formulation emphasizes on the production role of land. Consumption in
both periods are assumed to be non-negative,
c1,t,c 2,t+1 ≥ 0.
This realistic restriction will help us to rule out certain equilibrium paths. Let λ1,t, λ2,t





0(c2,t+1)/(1 + θ)=λ2,t, (4)
qtλ1,t = λ2,t (qt+1 + rt+1). (5)
To rule out “bubbles,” a transversality condition for the asset prices is imposed,
limi→∞ (1 + θ)









where c1,t = wt − qtlt, c2,t+1 =( qt+1 + rt+1)lt. Implicitly, (6) is a non-linear diﬀerence
equation of qt, together with other variables (such as wt,r t+1, etc.), which describe the
dynamics of the land price.
The production technology is constant returns to scale in land and labor. Recall that
the labor is supplied inelastically by the young generation whose population is normalized
to unity. Given that the factor market is assumed to be competitive, it gives rise to the
familiar conditions:
rt = f
0(lt), wt = f(lt) − ltf
0(lt), (7)
where f(lt) is the output per unit of labor given an input of lt units of land, f0 > 0,f 00 < 0.
At the equilibrium, the demand of land is equal to the supply, which is normalized to unity,
lt =1 , ∀t. (8)
Substituting (8) into (7) shows that the return to diﬀerent factors of production are constant











where c1,t = w − qt, c2,t+1 = qt+1 + r. Equation (9) can be interpreted as an asset-pricing
















where the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution Mt+j ≡ (1 + θ)
−1 u0(c2,t+j)/u0(c1,t+j−1)
9is the pricing kernel in standard asset pricing models. Clearly, if Mt+j changes over time,
then even if the rental income is constant over time, the land price can still ﬂuctuate.15
Hence, equation (10) demonstrates the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Even if the rental income of land is constant over time, the land price could still
ﬂuctutate in a dynamic equilibrium model with perfect foresight agents.
To generate more analytical results, we impose further restrictions on the preference
henceforth. Following the literature, we assume that the utility function exhibits the typical




, σ>0, σ 6=1 , (11)
where the elasticity of substitution is 1/σ in this case.16 Now, (9) can be re-written as








which explicitly shows how the land price evolves over time. Diﬀerentiating both sides of



















For the consumption in the ﬁr s tp e r i o dm u s tb ep o s i t i v e ,t h eu n i tl a n dp r i c em u s tb el o w e r





> 0. The ﬁrst order derivative thus depends
15It stands in contrast with Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), in which the ﬂuctuations of land prices come from
the changes in the expected future user cost as the agents’ utility function are linear. Furthermore, since
the rental rate of land is constant under our speciﬁcation, the “asset-speciﬁc risk” correlation between the
discount factor and asset-speciﬁc rate of return is zero.
16See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) for more discussion of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
When σ =1 ,u (c)=l o g c and the dynamics becomes trivial. Since the results in this paper applies to
any positive value of σ except when σ =1 , and the probability that the value of σ being exactly unity is
measure-zero, this limiting case is not considered in the main text.
10on whether σ is greater than or less than unity. The second order derivative can be easily
calculated to be strictly positive for any σ>0.B yd e ﬁnition, the price does not change at
the steady state, qt = qt+1 ≡ q. Now, for the existence of a positive land price at the steady









However, the unique steady state may not exist, and if it does, it may not be stable (we will
verify the existence and uniqueness in our numerical implementations). It means that the
land price could eventually be too high (or too low) and violate some equilibrium conditions.
It turns out that the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ plays a crucial
role here. For exposition, we treat the two diﬀerent cases separately:
1. If 0 <σ<1,t h e n−σ/(1−σ) < 0, and thus (12) shows that as qt → 0,q t+1 →− r<0.
Also, since 0 <σ<1,i ti sa l w a y st r u et h a t(1 − σ)
−1 (w/qt) − 1 > 0.B y ( 1 3 ) , w e
have dqt+1/dqt > 0, that is, land price is always increasing. Given that the second
order derivative is strictly positive, the dynamics of the land price is unstable, as
demonstrated in Figure 1a. Notice, however, that in this system, there is only a jump
variable (qt) and no sluggish variable. Therefore, as in the case of monetary economy in
overlapping generations models, the equilibrium price of land will immediately jump to
the steady state value and remain constant over time.17 This is not a very interesting
c a s ea n do u ra t t e n t i o nw i l ls w i t c ht ot h ef o l l o w i n gc a s e .
2. If σ>1, then −σ/(1 − σ) > 1, and thus (12) shows that as qt → 0,q t+1 →∞ . By
(13), σ>1 leads to dqt+1/dqt < 0. As shown in ﬁgure 1, the dynamical system can be
either “oscillatory and stable” (1b and 1c) or “explosive” (1d). In the former, when an
unexpected temporary shock hits this economy (such as a temporary change in taste,
17Among others, see Azariadis (1993), Wallace (1980) for more discussion.
11in tax rate, or even the productivity), the land price will oscillate above and below
the steady state value. It will eventually converge to the steady state value but the
convergence is not monotonic. Notice, however, that there are inﬁnitely many paths to
the unique steady state that are also consistent with the equation (12), as the initial
land price is not dictated by any of the ﬁrst order conditions. Thus, we encounter
the situation of “path indeterminacy” which has been studied by the macroeconomics
literature.18
On the other hand, if the system is “explosive”, i.e. the land price will either be
“too high” that it will eventually exceed the ﬁrst period wage income, pushing the
ﬁrst period consumption to be negative, or it becomes “too low” (diverges to negative
inﬁnity) so that the second period consumption becomes negative.19 Since neither of
these are allowed, the price will jump to the steady state immediately. In other words,
we have a constant price equilibrium path, as in the case with 0 <σ<1.
[Insert ﬁgure 1 here]
2.1 Discussion of the Results
The previous section shows that, even a simple model with land as a factor of production is
capable of generating land price cycles under certain conditions, depending on whether the
value of σ is larger than unity or not. This section attempts to provide some intuition behind
these results. First, notice that when an agent is old, she is rather “passive”: she simply
collects the rent and sells all her land, and then consumes. The important economic decision
is made when the agent is young. Furthermore, since labor is supplied inelastically when
18See Baumol and Benhabib (1989) for more discussion.
19The value of land cannot be negative because land is a productive input here.
12young, the purchase of land should be the main focus. Thus, the task here is to characterize
the young generation’s demand function for land.








Given the utility functional form (11), we can rewrite the equation (6) without imposing
the equilibrium condition. After some manipulations, it can be shown that the function of










Notice that the rate of return for holding land Rt is increasing in qt+1 (see (15)). Hence,
other things being equal, it is feasible to compute the partial derivative of the demand of
































> 0 if 0 <σ<1
< 0 if σ>1
,
which proves the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Other things being equal, the demand of land increases (decreases)w i t ht h e( e x -
pected) future land price if 0 <σ<1 (σ>1).
The intuition of the lemma is simple. Consider ﬁrst the case when σ is low, which means
that agents are more willing to substitute current consumption for future consumption. If
13they expect that the future land price will appreciate, then they will devote more resources
to demand for land, which in turn raises investment, given the current price of land. In
equilibrium, since the supply of land is ﬁxed, the agents’ willingness to intertemporal sub-
stitution also raises the current land price qt. This gives an intuitive explanation why (13)
exhibits a positive relationship between qt and qt+1 given a low value of σ,w h i c hl e a d st oa n
explosive dynamics. Since the agents are perfect foresight, the price will jump to the steady
state and stays at that level from that period onwards.
On the other hand, when agents have a higher σ, which means that agents are reluctant
to make intertemporal substitution, a higher future land price qt+1 would only suppress the
current demand of land. To see why, note that a higher qt+1 raises period t+1consumption
for a given period t land holding. To maximize her lifetime utility, the agent will smooth
out the consumption plan and increases period t consumption given the current price of land
qt. This results in a decline in the demand for land, and hence a decline in the current land
price qt. This also explains why in this case (13) exhibits a negative relationship between qt
and qt+1 given a high value of σ.
Notice that merely positive correlation between the present land price qt and the future
land price qt+1 is not suﬃcient to generate unstable dynamics.I tm u s tb ec o u p l e dw i t ht h e
conditions that the future land price is negative when the present land price approaches zero,
and that the magnitude of the “feedback” is large enough, i.e., |dqt+1/dqt| > 1. Otherwise, a
steady state might not even exist. While |dqt+1/dqt| ≶ 1 depends on the combination of all
of the parameter values and can only be veriﬁed numerically, the condition that the future
land price is positive or negative as the present land price approaches zero, can be easily
calculated. Figure 2 provides numerical examples and graphical illustrations. Figure 2a and
2b draw the movement of qt+1 against qt with relatively large σ (5 and 6 respectively), and
the former leads to constant-price equilibria and the latter shows cycles.
[Insert ﬁgure 2 here]
142.2 Welfare Implications
As it is shown in the previous sub-section, the land price could ﬂuctuate even with a small
temporary shock (the “path indeterminacy” case). Therefore, it is reasonable to suspect that
the welfare of agents of diﬀerent cohorts could also vary over time. This section studies the
evolution of agents’ welfare in this economy. Now deﬁne the life-time utility of a represen-
tative agent of the cohort born at time t to be Wt ≡ u(c1,t)+( 1+θ)
−1 u(c2,t+1).A t t h e
equilibrium, their consumption plan is c1,t = w − qt and c2,t+1 = qt+1 + r. Combining the
utility function of (11) with (12), the life-time utility of the period t cohort (or in short, the
life-time utility) is given by






















> 0 if 0 <σ<1
< 0 if σ>1
.
For the case of small value of σ (0 <σ<1), the life-time utility of the period t cohort
is increasing in the value of land. However, the earlier result has already established that
this corresponds to the case where the land price immediately jumps to the steady state and
remain constant over time. Thus, the welfare of diﬀerent cohort will also remain constant at
the equilibrium. On the other hand, for the case of large σ (σ>1), the life-time utility of
the period t cohort is decreasing with the price of land. We also know that the dynamics of
land price can either be oscillatory and stable, or explosive, and that dqt+1/dqt < 0.T h i si s
the case when we have an “path indeterminacy” of land price. Consider the case when the
equilibrium exhibits oscillatory convergence. Since the land price oscillates above and below
the steady state value, the life-time utility of the period t cohort will be higher than the
immediate next generation if the land price in period t is lower than that in the following
15period.
2.3 Numerical Examples
As shown in ﬁgure 2, the model is capable of generating oscillatory dynamics as the land
price converges to the steady state value, or two-period cycles where the land price always
oscillates between two values. In other words, land price cycle is a “possibility” in this model.
However, one may wonder how large the “probability” of the cycle is. To put it in another
way, with empirically plausible parameter values, how likely would these cycles occur? To
answer these questions, it demands a precise estimation of the parameters from the data.
This section presents numerical examples to investigate the dynamics of land price implied
by the model.
The typical parameter value used in the macroeconomics literature on the time discount
factor β ≡ (1+θ)−1 is about 0.96 for annual data.20 It translates to a value of θ in between
1.2624 to 2.4014 in our two-period OLG model in which each period corresponds to a period
of 20 to 30 years.21 These calculations, however, are based on the inﬁnite horizon model, and
hence the discount factor include both life-cycle discounting and altruism for oﬀsprings. The
current model, on the other hand, focuses primarily on life-cycle discounting and thus the
appropriate discount factor should be lower. Unfortunately, the empirical literature on the
existence of altruism is controversial, and thus a widely accepted estimate of the altruism is
unavailable. It should nevertheless be clear that even if the annual discount factor is adjusted
to 0.85, the implied θ w o u l db ei nt h er a n g eo f24.8 (for a period of 20 years) to 130.05 (for a
period of 30 years). The precise estimation of the pure life-cycle discount factor still awaits
for future research.
The estimate for σ is even more problematic. In an inﬁnite horizon asset pricing model
20For instance, see Cooley (1995).
21The calculation is simple. If the annual discount factor is 0.96. Thus, the discount factor for 20 and 30
years are 0.442 and 0.294 respectively. Then simply apply the formula that θ = β
−1 − 1 yields the result.
16calibrated with quarterly data, Mehra and Prescott (1985) claims that σ is within a narrow
range, 0 ≤ σ ≤ 10. However, Kandel and Stanbaugh (1991), Abel (2002) forcefully argue
that, even for quarterly data, the range of σ is in fact much larger. The issue is even more
complicated here because each period of our two-period OLG model corresponds to 20 or
even 30 years. It is not very clear how the previously mentioned estimates would apply to
the current model. Due to these yet-to-be-solved problems, this paper simply experiments
with a wide range of parameter values, θ and σ, between 0 and 100.
Figure 3a shows two regions of parameter combinations between σ and θ: the region
delivering constant price equilibria (dark-shadowed area) and the region delivering oscillatory
convergence (light-shadowed area). The 2-period cycle cases occur on the boundary of the
two regions. It is clear that although the region which delivers the “land price cycles” is large,
it is necessary (but not suﬃcient) to have θ>10 and σ>3. It puts some severe restrictions
on the parameter values and might be not satisfactory to some. In a sense, it might not be
very surprising because this model has thus far assumes a time-separable utility function,
and rational expectations asset pricing model with time-separable utility functions has been
found to perform unsatisfactorily.22 Recent research seems to suggest that allowing for time-
non-separable utility functions can signiﬁcantly improve the ability for the model to match
the data (Constantinides (1990), Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (1997)). Following this line
of thought, the next section extends the analysis to diﬀerent types of time-non-separable
utility functions.
[Insert ﬁgure 3 here]
22For instance, see the survey by Kocherlakota (1996).
173 Non-Separable Utility Function
There are at least two types of time-non-separable utility function widely used in the liter-
ature. In the terminology of Carroll et al. (1997), one is “inward-looking” and the other
is “outward-looking.” In the former, the second period consumption is discounted by the
amount of her own consumption in the ﬁrst period (“habit formation”), whereas under the
latter case, it is discounted by the average consumption in the ﬁrst period (“catching up with
the Joneses”). Under the outward-looking case, the agent fails to take into consideration
that her consumption decision would have an impact to the aggregate/average consump-
tion. Although at the equilibrium, the individual consumption coincides with the average
consumption level, the dynamics displayed and the welfare implication can be diﬀerent, as
demonstrated by Carroll et al. (1997). Since it is empirically diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate the
“inward-looking” from the “outward-looking” preference, this paper considers both types for
completeness.
3.1 Habit Formation







subject to the constraints (1) and (2), and that the consumption in both periods are non-
negative, c1,t,c 2,t+1 ≥ 0. T h ea g e n ti sa w a r eo ft h ee ﬀect of ﬁrst period consumption c1,t
on the periodic utility in both periods, u(c1,t) and v(c2,t+1,c 1,t).A s b e f o r e , λ1,t and λ2,t
represent the Lagrangian multipliers of the constraints (1) and (2) respectively. The ﬁrst


























where c1,t = w − qt, c2,t+1 = qt+1 + r. To examine the dynamics more explicitly, two special
cases of time-non-separable utility function are considered.
1. Subtractive Habit Formation
This form of time-non-separable utility can be at least traced back to the seminal work










where 0 <a<1, σ>0, σ 6=1 .23 It is further imposed that c2,t+1 − ac1,t > 0. In the














2. Multiplicative Habit Formation
This form of habit formation has also been widely used in the asset pricing and macro-











where 0 <γ<1, 0 <σ , σ 6=1 . It is clear that if c1,t, c2,t+1 > 0,t h e nc2,t+1 (c1,t)
−γ > 0.
23When σ → 1, u(c1,t) → ln(c1,t), and v(c2,t+1,c 1,t)=l n( c2,t+1 − ac1,t). The results and the derivations
are similar and therefore skipped due to the space constraint.
24For instance, see Carroll, Overland, and Weil (1997, 2000), Carroll (2000), and the reference therein.
19In the appendix, it is shown that equation (18) can be re-written as
(1 + θ)(qt)











In the appendix, it is further shown that under some conditions, there is a unique Rt
that solves (19) ((20)) in the case of subtractive (multiplicative) habit formation. Figure 3b
shows that, holding other parameter constant, there is a wider range of parameters which
generates cyclical land price dynamics with multiplicative habit formation. Virtually any
value of θ can generate oscillatory convergence, provided that a suitable value of σ is chosen.
The restriction on σ, on the other hand, has not be relaxed. On the other hand, as Figure
3 cs h o w s ,s u b t r a c t i v eh a b i tf o r m a t i o ni se v e nw o r s et h a nt h eb a s e l i n ec a s e .
3 . 2 C a t c h i n gu pw i t ht h eJ o n e s e s
The next class of time-non-separable utility function, “Catching up with the Joneses”, can








subject to the constraints (1) and (2), where c1,t is the average consumption level of the
period t. The consumption in both periods are required to be non-negative, c1,t,c 2,t+1 ≥ 0.
As before, let λ1,t and λ2,t be the Lagrangian multipliers of the constraints (1) and (2)
respectively. The ﬁrst order conditions (4) and (5) are still valid. Condition (3) is also valid
because the agent takes the average consumption c1,t as given. Therefore, combining the
ﬁrst order conditions and the market equilibrium conditions, and the fact that c1,t = c1,t, we











which is diﬀerent from both the time-separable case (see (9)) and habit formation case (see
(18)). To compare with the habit formation case, we also consider both subtractive and
multiplicative cases.
1. Subtractive Catching Up with Joneses











where 0 <a<1,a n dσ>0. It is further imposed that c2,t+1 −ac1,t > 0. Equation














which is diﬀerent from (19) by only a constant term.
2. Multiplicative Catching Up with the Joneses












where 0 <γ<1, σ>0,a n dσ 6=1 . It is clear that if c1,t, c2,t+1 > 0,t h e nw eh a v e
21c2,t+1 (c1,t)
−γ > 0. In the appendix, it is shown that equation (21) can be rewritten as
(1 + θ)(qt)
σ (w − qt)
γ(1−σ)−σ =( Rt)
1−σ , (23)
which is only diﬀerent from (20) by one term.
The qualitative as well as quantitative results of catching-up-with-the-Joneses preference,
as shown in Figure 3d and 3e, are similar to the case of habit formation.25 The multiplicative
case produces a wider region of parameter combinations that deliver oscillatory land prices,
while the subtractive is worse than the baseline case in terms of generating cyclical dynamics.
4 Extension: Endogenous Survival Probability
Thus far, we have assumed that the population is constant over time and all young agents
will surely survive in the following period. However, this may not be a good assumption for
some historical situations, or some developing countries in the modern time, as the possibility
of infant death in those scenarios is not trivial. In light of this, we relax the assumption of
constant population: the second period probability of survival is no longer unity but will
depend on the ﬁrst period consumption. This seems to be in agreement with the empirical
evidence.26 An agent may die due to diseases or insuﬃcient “nutrition” she receives in
the ﬁrst period. The probability of survival is assumed to be positively correlated to the
ﬁrst period consumption. If the agent dies in the second period, she receives zero utility
and the income from land re-sale and rental will be collected by the government and then
25The value of a and γ used in the numerical exercises is rather small and well within the estimate of the
empirical literature. See Constantinides (1990), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Li (2001) and the reference
therein.
26For an review of the literature, among others, see Kalemli-Ozcan (2003).









s.t. c1,t + qtlt ≤ wt + τ1,t,
(qt+1 + rt+1)lt + τ2,t+1 ≥ c2,t+1, (24)
where β(c1t) is the probability for an agent born in time t to survive in time t +1given
an amount of consumption c1t t a k e ni np e r i o dt, 0 ≤ β(c1,t) ≤ 1, β
0(.) > 0, β
00(.) < 0, τ1,t,
τ2,t+1 ≥ 0 are the lump-sum transfer received from the government at the ﬁrst and second
period of time, which is taken as given by the individual. Essentially, the discount factor is














where Rt =( qt+1 + rt+1)/qt. To determine the dynamics of the land price, it is necessary
to have the exact functional form of the discount factor, and the details of the government
budget. Following Kalemli-Ozcan (2002), we assume that
β(c1,t)=a0 (1 − exp(−a1c1,t)), (26)
which clearly satisﬁes the conditions stated previously. Using the World Bank data, Kalemli-
Ozcan (2002) estimates that a0 is in between 0.74 (1960) to 0.82 (1997) and a1 is in between
0.36 (1960) to 0.44 (1997) for adult survival rate, and the estimates are statistically signiﬁ-
cant.
The behavior of the government is to tax 100 percent bequests of those who die early
and redistributes to the rest of the population. All the income and asset of those who die
23at the end of the ﬁrst period will be collected and redistributed in a lump sum manner.27
We assume that the probability of dying is identically and independently distributed across
agents. Thus, by the Law of Large Numbers, the proportion of dying in the aggregate is
equal to the probability in the individual level. Since we have assumed that the population
size of each cohort is unity, the government budget constraint takes the following form,
τ1,t+1 + β(c1,t)τ2,t+1 =( 1− β(c1,t))(qt+1 + rt+1),
as the market clearing condition implies lt =1 . It remains to determine how these “accidental
bequests” are to be distributed. For simplicity, we assume that all of these bequests go to
the surviving old. In this case, τ1,t+1 =0 , ∀t,a n d
β(c1,t)τ2,t+1 =( 1− β(c1,t))(qt+1 + rt+1). (27)

















Notice that the discount factor β depends on the ﬁrst period consumption c1,t,w h i c hi nt u r n
depends on period t land price qt, as made clear in (24). It is indeed a highly non-linear
diﬀerence equation. We can then proceed with some numerical examples.
Figure 4 shows that the dynamics and conﬁguration of the steady state can be very rich.
Figure 4a presents a case with a stable steady state. In Figure 4b, however, we actually
have three steady states, in which one of them is stable (denoted P). Recall our earlier
discussion that since there is no state variable and the price is a jump variable by deﬁnition,
27In Kalemli-Ozcan (2002, p.416-7), it is assumed that capital is not an input in the production and return
to land is zero. Thus, the re-distribution of “accidental bequest” is not present in Kalemli-Ozcan (2002). In
this paper, the manner of distribution will make a diﬀerence.
24an “unstable” steady state corresponds to a constant land price in this economy. Therefore,
the “mathematically unstable steady states” are in fact very “stable” in an economic sense,
as the land price and other variables are constant over time.
On the other hand, a “stable” steady state (mathematically speaking) corresponds to a
case of path indeterminacy, where the land price will oscillate around the steady state value.
In other words, depends on the initial land price, this economy can stay at one of the two
constant land price steady states, or experience cyclical ﬂuctuations in land price. Notice
that there is a “multiple steady state” issue here and depends on the initial condition and
belief of economic agents, the economy may rest in diﬀerent steady states.
Notice also that it is not straightforward to order the welfare of agent at diﬀerent steady
states in a Pareto sense. Consider, for example, the economy starts with a steady state at
a higher land price. The young agents are then left with less income for food, resulting in
a lower probability of survival. This further discourages the young generation to save. A
positive death rate also means that, other things being equal, the lump sum transfer from
the government to the “survivors” will be higher. For a young agent, she might prefer an
economy with low land price and h e n c es h ec a na l l o c a t em o r er e s o u r c eo nf o o da n di n c r e a s e
the probability of survival. However, in ex post terms, the agent who survive may prefer to
receive a higher payment from the government and that they can sell their land at a higher
price. And clearly, with these inter-generational conﬂict of interest, it is not easy to compare
the social welfare across diﬀerent steady states.
In terms of dynamics, notice that the economy can also switch from one steady state to
another when the economy is hit by a shock. In that case, there will be a very dramatic
changes in land price and population size (due to the survival probability dependency on
the consumption of young generation), on top of the “convergence dynamics” towards the
steady state. While this model is highly stylized and should be interpreted with cautions,
the results may shed light on the historical experience of certain economies documented in,
among others, Gottlieb (1976), Macfarlane (1979), and Sakolski (1932).
25[Insert ﬁgure 4 here]
5 Concluding Remarks
Land is a very important element in the economy. As the reference cited in the introduction
suggests, land is an important factor of production even for modern economies. The land
price ﬂuctuation would signiﬁcantly aﬀect the credit constraints of ﬁrms and hence their
investment. It could translate into changes in aggregate demand and have an impact to the
macroeconomy. This paper illustrates that there is an intrinsic tendency to generate land
price cycle in an overlapping generations model, even when factors such as capital market
imperfection, informational incompleteness, non-convexity, uncertainty, etc. are abstracted
away. It holds with typical time-separable utility function with a wide range of parameter
values, and even wider range with multiplicative time-non-separable preference. It seems to
suggest that land price cycle is inevitable in a simple general equilibrium OLG model, given a
large class of utility functions and a wide spectrum of parameter combinations. Furthermore,
we ﬁnd that when the survival probability of old agents depends on the consumption of when
the agents are young, we can have multiple steady states and very rich dynamics under certain
parameter values. In particular, a change in some parameter or policy may move the economy
from a constant-price steady state to another with land price cycles, or vice versa. Clearly,
this model can potentially be extended for interesting policy analysis. In addition, this model
also highlights that the interest of young agents may be very diﬀerent from those who are
old. Thus, it may be fruitful to introduce majority voting or other political process into the
model. These eﬀorts may contribute to the understanding of the cross-country diﬀerence in
their historical development experience, especially when land played an important role in
the production process.
This research can also be extended in several directions, such as an introduction of
physical capital (for instance, see Mountford, 2002), endogenous fertility choice (for instance,
26see Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder and Weil, 2000), endogenizing the supply of land, or including
residential housing (for instance, see Wheaton 1999, Leung, 2003), the interaction between
internet use and land use (for instance, see Quah (2000), Schlauch and Laposa (2001),
Shibusawa (2000)). In particular, allowing the land both as an input of production and also
as a collateral would enable us to have a deeper understanding of the interactions of cyclical
behavior in diﬀerent sectors of the economy.28 In terms of welfare analysis, this model can
also be extended to include both intra- and inter-generational heterogeneity among agents.
It may be proved to be a convenient and plausible vehicle for diﬀerent policy analysis.
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32A Appendix
A.1 Proof of (13)
Recall that (12) is








Now we diﬀerentiate both sides with respect to qt. It gives the following expression:
dqt+1
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2 . Substituting all these
into the expression, we have
dqt+1
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Clearly, we can group terms and further simplify that as
dqt+1
dqt




































Thus, we can further simplify it as
dqt+1
dqt









































which is indeed (13).
A.2 Proof of (14)
Again, we recall (12). Now, at the steady state, qt+1 = qt. For simplicity, we call that value
q.T h u s ,w eh a v e



















Re-arranging terms, we will have (14).
A.3 Proofs of the Cases of Non-separable Utility Functions
1. Subtractive Habit Formation
This form of time-non-separable utility can be at least traced back to the seminal work










where 0 <a<1, σ>0, σ 6=1 . It is further imposed that c2,t+1 − ac1,t > 0. Equation
(18) can be re-written as
(c1,t)−σ − a(1 + θ)−1 (c2,t+1 − ac1,t)
−σ









































34Notice that with any ﬁxed level of qt, both sides of (19) are increasing in Rt.T h er i g h t
hand side is positive even when Rt =0 . In fact, it is linear in Rt, with a positive slope
(1 + θ)−1 < 1. On the other hand, except when σ is an integer, the left hand side is
not well deﬁned for Rt <a(w/qt − 1). For Rt >a(w/qt − 1) > 0, the left hand side
is concave/linear/convex in Rt if σ<1/ σ =1 / σ>1. Clearly, given a value of qt
and for σ>1, t h e r ei sau n i q u ev a l u eo fRt which solves (19). For σ<1, there might
and might not be a solution, depending on the combination of the parameter values.







where f1t =( 1+θ)−1Rt (qt)





































. Clearly, if Rt > 1,t h e nf1t >f 2t.
Furthermore, when f2t > 0,w eh a v edqt+1/dqt > 1 (which means monotone and ex-
plosive), but when f2t < 0, dqt+1/dqt is negative and |dqt+1/dqt| can be either larger
than unity (which means oscillatory and explosive) or smaller than unity (which means
oscillatory and stable). Thus, whether the steady state exists, or whether it displays
any oscillatory or monotonic dynamics can only be veriﬁed numerically for plausible
parameter values.
2. Multiplicative Habit Formation
This form of habit formation has also be widely used in the asset pricing and macro-











where 0 <γ<1, 0 <σ , σ 6=1 . It is clear that if c1,t, c2,t+1 > 0,t h e nc2,t+1 (c1,t)
−γ > 0.
Equation (18) can be re-written as























29For any given set of parameter values, the existence can be easily veriﬁed numerically.




















thus we can rewrite the earlier equation as
(1 + θ)(qt)











where Rt =( qt+1 + r)/qt. Notice that the left hand side of (20) is invariant to Rt
and the right hand side is monotonic increasing (decreasing) in Rt if σ<1 (σ>1).
Notice also that the left hand side is always positive, while the right hand side is
equal to zero when Rt =0 . Taking log on both sides of (20) and utilitize the fact that





























where Rtqt = qt+1 + r by deﬁnition. Hence, dqt+1/dqt can be either positive or nega-
tive. Thus, whether the steady state exists, or whether it displays any oscillatory or
monotonic dynamics can only be veriﬁed numerically for plausible parameter values.
3. Subtractive Catching Up with the Joneses







subject to the constraints (1) and (2), where c1,t is the average consumption level
of the period t. The consumption in both periods are required to be non-negative,
c1,t,c 2,t+1 ≥ 0. As before, let λ1,t, λ2,t be the Langrange multipliers of the constraints (1)
and (2) respectively. The ﬁrst order conditions (4) and (5) are still valid. Condition (3)
is also valid because the agent takes the average consumption c1,t as given. Therefore,
combining the ﬁrst order conditions and the market equilibrium conditions, and the
fact that
c1,t = c1,t,











which is diﬀerent from both the time-separable case (see (9)) and habit formation case
(see (18)). To ﬁx the idea, we also consider both subtractive and multiplicative cases.
To be comparable with the subtractive habit formation case, the utility functions are
36assumed to be similar: u(c1,t)=
(c1,t)1−σ
1−σ ,a n dv(c2,t+1,c1,t)=
(c2,t+1−ac1,t)1−σ
1−σ , 0 <a<1,






















which is diﬀerent from (19) by only a constant term. Again, with any ﬁxed level of qt,
both sides of (22) are increasing in Rt. The right hand side is zero when Rt =0 . In
fact, it is linear in Rt, with a positive slope (1 + θ)−1 < 1. On the other hand, except











, the left hand side is concave/linear/convex in Rt if σ<1/ σ =1 /
σ>1. Clearly, with qt being ﬁxed and for σ>1, t h e r ei sau n i q u ev a l u eo fRt which
solves (22). For σ ≤ 1, t h e r em i g h ta n dm i g h tn o tb eas o l u t i o n ,d e p e n d i n go nt h e
combination of the parameter values. We assume that there is a solution for (22).31
As in the subtractive habit formation case, whether the steady state exists, or whether
it displays any oscillatory or monotonic dynamics can only be veriﬁed numerically for
plausible parameter values.
4. Multiplicative Catching Up with the Joneses
To be comparable with the subtractive habit formation case, the utility functions
assumed are again similar: u(c1,t)=
(c1,t)1−σ
1−σ ,a n dv(c2,t+1,c1,t)=(c2,t+1(c1,t)−γ)
1−σ
1−σ ,
0 <γ<1, 0 <σ , σ 6=1 . It is clear that if c1,t, c2,t+1 > 0, c2,t+1 (c1,t)
−γ > 0. Equation
(30) can be re-written as
(c1,t)−σ
































31For any given set of parameter values, the existence can be easily veriﬁed numerically.
37the earlier equation can be re-written as
(1 + θ)(qt)
σ (w − qt)
γ(1−σ)−σ =( Rt)
1−σ ,
which is only diﬀerent from (20) by one term. The left hand side of (23) is invariant
to Rt and the right hand side is monotonic increasing (decreasing) in Rt if σ<1
(σ>1). Notice also that the left hand side is always positive, while the right hand




















γ(1 − σ) − σ
w − qt | {z }
+ve
,
where Rtqt = qt+1 + r by deﬁnition. Hence,
dqt+1
dqt can be either positive or nega-
tive. Thus, whether the steady state exists, or whether it displays any oscillatory or
monotonic dynamics can only be veriﬁed numerically for plausible parameter values.
A.4 Some Derivations for the Case of Endogenous Survival Prob-
ability
Notice that by (26), we have
β
0(c1t)=a1a0 exp(−a1c1t)
= a1 (a0 − β(c1t)).





































Notice that under this regime, c1,t = w−qt, and β, β
0 are functions of c1,t only. Thus, the
r i g h th a n ds i d eo f( 2 8 )i si nt e r m so fqt only, and (28) describes a very non-linear relationship
between qt and qt+1.
38Figure 1  Dynamics of Land Prices 
 
 
(1a) unstable  ( 1 0 < <σ )                          (1b) oscillatory convergence ( 1 > σ ) 
 
(1c) center ( 1 > σ )                                   (1d) oscillatory divergence ( 1 > σ ) 
   
                                                                                                             
 
 
Figure 2  Numerical Examples for “oscillatory convergence” and “cycles” 
 
(2a) oscillatory convergence                                            (2b) cycles 
 







































































































 Figure 4    Dynamics of Land Price with Endogenous Survival Probability 
 
(a) Stable cycle (r=0.02, sigma=8, w=0.3, tau1(t=1)=0.0001) 
 
(b)    Multiple steady states (r=0.04, sigma=2.5, w=0.5, tau1(t=1)=0.0001) 
 
 